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Abstract 
BRITTAIN L. MAHAFFEY: Evaluating a Cognitive-Behavioral Model of Pathological 
Mirror Gazing: Implications for the Maintenance of Anxiety and Appearance 
Dissatisfaction in Body Dysmorphic Disorder 
(Under the direction of Jonathan S. Abramowitz, Ph.D.) 
Body dysmorphic disorder (BDD) is a condition in which an individual is excessively 
preoccupied with an imagined physical defect or a slight physical anomaly. Cognitive 
behavioral models of BDD posit that excessive mirror gazing plays a key role in the 
maintenance of BDD. Research suggests that mirror gazing is a safety behavior which 
elicits heightened self-focused attention and cognitive comparisons to unrealistic beauty 
ideals. These factors are thought to provoke anxiety and appearance distress. To date, 
however, these mechanisms have not been experimentally tested and there has been no 
research examining the relationship between mirror gazing and anxiety. Therefore, the 
aims of the present study were twofold: one to examine whether mirror gazing can 
provoke subjective anxiety, and two to experimentally test the mechanisms thought to 
explain the relationship between mirror gazing and anxiety. Seventy-nine undergraduate 
females were randomized into four conditions: (1) simple attention to appearance, (2) 
simple mirror gazing, (3) mirror gazing + self focused attention, and (4) mirror gazing + 
self-focused attention + comparisons to beauty ideals. Following from Veale’s (2004) 
model, we predicted that conditions 2-4 would result in increased anxiety and appearance 
distress, with condition 4 evoking the greatest distress and anxiety over the course of the 
task. A multilevel modeling (MLM) approach was employed for the purposes of data 
analysis. Results suggest that mirror gazing alone is not sufficient to provoke increased 
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appearance dissatisfaction and that targeted negative SFA and beauty related cognitive 
distortions play a greater role in eliciting dissatisfaction than previously thought. Further, 
they suggest that these types of tasks do not elicit subjective anxiety in healthy 
individuals. Additional research is needed to evaluate the relationship between mirror 
gazing behaviors and subjective anxiety in samples with BDD and to test the efficacy of 
interventions targeting SFA and beauty related cognitive distortions.
  
  
 
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank my Committee for their guidance and support throughout 
this process. I would also like to express my gratitude to my mentor, Dr. Jonathan 
Abramowitz, for his support and encouragement. 
  
vi 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………..……….viii 
LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………..…………………………..…ix 
ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………………….………x 
Chapter 
 
I. EVALUATING A COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF 
PATHOLOGICAL MIRROR GAZING: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
MAINTENANCE OF ANXIETY AND APPEARANCE 
DISSATISFACTION IN BODY DYSMORPHIC DISORDER……......…….1 
 
Cognitive Behavioral Models of BDD……………………...…………………3 
Similarities between BDD and Anxiety Disorders:  
The Role of Safety Behaviors………………………………………………………..5 
Safety behaviors in panic disorder and social phobia……….………………..5 
Compulsions in OCD………………………………………………………….5 
Excessive mirror gazing and BDD……………………………..……………..6 
Experimental Research and Mirror Gazing…………………………………..9 
Specific Aims and Hypotheses of the Present Study…………………………..7 
II. METHODS………………………………………………………………..…20 
Participants…………………………………………..………………………20 
Procedures……………………………..…………………………………….21 
vii 
 
Measures…………………………………………………..…………………27 
III. RESULTS…………………………………………………………………....34 
Main Analysis……………………..…………………………..…………..….37 
Manipulation Check and Exploratory Measures……....……………….....…40 
IV. DISCUSSION…..……………………………………………..…..…………42 
REFERENCES……………………………...……………………….………………59 
viii 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 
1. Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations of Primary Study  
Variables at Baseline..............................................................................................48 
 
2. Fixed Effects (Top) and Variance-Covariance Estimates (Bottom) for Models  
Predicting Appearance Dissatisfaction………………..…………………..……..49 
   
3. Manipulation Check and Exploratory Items……………………………………..50 
 
ix 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 
1. Participant Flow, Study Design.............................................................................52 
 
2. Mean Subjective Anxiety by Condition and Time of Assessment..........………..53 
 
3. Mean Image Dissatisfaction by Condition and Time of Assessment…...……….54 
 
4. Regression of Dissatisfaction on Time by Condition,  
Model Implied Trajectories………………………………………………………55 
 
  
  
 
x 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
APA  American Psychiatric Association 
 
BDD  Body Dysmorphic Disorder 
 
CBT  Cognitive Behavioral Therapy 
 
NSFA  Negative Self Focused Attention 
 
OCD  Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
 
  
  
 
 
EVALUATING A COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF PATHOLOGICAL 
MIRROR GAZING: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF ANXIETY 
AND APPEARANE DISSATISFACTION IN BODY DYSMORPHIC DISORDER 
 
Body dysmorphic disorder (BDD) is a condition in which an individual is excessively 
preoccupied with an imagined physical defect or a very slight physical anomaly 
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000). Unlike those with anorexia or bulimia 
nervosa, patients with BDD are not primarily concerned with their weight or overall body 
shape. Instead, their worries center on specific body areas such as the hair, skin, ears, 
eyes or nose. Thus, a patient with BDD might be convinced that their nose is horribly 
deformed, where an outside observer can detect no defect. While preoccupations with 
easily observable body areas are most common, patients may also be concerned with the 
appearance of less visible areas such as their muscles or genitals (Albertini & Phillips, 
1999). These preoccupations tend to be significantly time consuming. BDD patients 
spend 3-8 hours a day on average, thinking about their “defect,” scrutinizing their 
appearance in mirrors, or trying to camouflage the area with make-up or clothing 
(Phillips, 1996; Veale, 2000). Although there is some variability in prevalence estimates, 
BDD is thought to affect slightly more than 2% of the adult US population and to occur 
at roughly equal rates in women and men (Koran, Abujaoude, Large, & Serpe, 2008; 
Phillips & Diaz, 1997).  
BDD onset typically occurs in adolescence and runs a chronic and debilitating course 
(Phillips, Kim, & Hudson, 1995; Phillips, Pagano, Manard, & Stout, 2006). BDD patients 
score significantly lower on quality of life, psychosocial functioning, and mental health
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 measures than individuals with major depression (Phillips, Menard, Fay, & Pango, 
2005). Further, they report extremely high levels of suicidal ideation (45-75%; Perugi et 
al., 1997; Phillips, McElroy, Keck, Pope & Hudson, 1993) and suicide attempts (22-24%; 
Phillips & Diaz, 1997; Veale et al., 1996). Finally, data suggest that the probability of a 
BDD patient attaining symptom remission without intervention is extremely low. One 
study found that the likelihood of patients achieving functional remission over a three 
year period was less than 5.7% (Phillips, Quinn, & Stout, 2008). Despite the severity of 
this disorder, BDD remains under-researched compared to other body image disorders 
(Veale, 2004). Thus, research to illuminate the etiological and maintaining factors 
involved in BDD is critically needed. 
Highlighting the questions that remain about this disorder, in recent years, critics have 
questioned BDD’s classification within the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) nosology as a 
somatoform disorder. Criticism focuses on the fact that BDD is rarely comorbid with 
other disorders in the category and the fact that BDD seems to differ significantly from 
somatoform disorders in terms of structure and form (Gunstad & Phillips, 2003; 
Hollander, Cohen, & Simeon, 1993; Phillips, Price, Greenberg, & Rasmussen, 2003). For 
example, BDD is characterized by obsessional preoccupations and repetitive behaviors; 
conversion disorder, a more prototypical somatoform disorder, in contrast is 
characterized by deficits in sensory functions such as medically unexplained paralysis or 
blindness. Further while patients with BDD experience marked distress from their 
symptoms, those with conversion disorders often report a total lack of concern about their 
symptoms (i.e., la belle  indifférence). In actuality BDD appears more similar to anxiety 
disorders such as OCD and social phobia (Coles et al., 2006; Hollander and Rosen, 
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2000), than to somatoform disorders. The functional similarities between BDD and 
anxiety disorders, as discussed next, are evident in cognitive behavioral models of BDD. 
Cognitive Behavioral Models of BDD 
A number of models have been proposed to explain the development and 
maintenance of BDD. Of these, cognitive behavioral models (e.g., Neziroglu, Roberts, & 
Yaryura-Tobias, 2004; Veale 2004; Veale et al., 1996) have received the most attention 
and empirical support. These models stem from Cash’s (2002) cognitive-social model of 
body image disturbance.  It proposes that factors such as cultural socialization, 
interpersonal experiences, physical characteristics, and personality characteristics lead to 
the development of negative body image and attitudes. These attitudes in turn elicit 
negative emotions and behaviors related to body image that are maintained via negative 
reinforcement. These models also incorporate other factors thought to play a role in the 
maintenance of BDD such as imagery, attentional biases, and cognitive comparisons to 
beauty ideals (Neziroglu, Khemlani-Patel, Veale, 2008). Amongst the cognitive 
behavioral models, Veale’s (2004; Veale et al., 1996) account of BDD has received the 
most empirical scrutiny; thus it will be described in further detail here. 
According to Veale’s model (2004; Veale et al., 1996), two factors are thought to 
underlie the development of BDD: (a) maladaptive beliefs about the importance and 
necessity of bodily perfection and (b) selective negative self-focused attention.  
Maladaptive beliefs in BDD frequently take the form of conditional assumptions about 
one’s appearance (e.g., “If I’m unattractive, life isn’t worth living”, “If I looked better, 
my whole life would be better”). Self-focused attention, on the other hand, is generally 
characterized as an awareness of self-referent, internally generated information (Ingram, 
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1990).  In the case of BDD, self-focused attention takes the form of a heightened 
awareness of, and focus on, a negative mental image of one’s own physical appearance. 
Self-focused attention is also thought to play an important role in other disorders such as 
social phobia (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995). In social phobia, however, self-focused 
attention takes the form of an attentional shift towards one’s behavior (e.g, the quality of 
one’s voice, physical signs of anxiety such as blushing and shaking etc.) rather than one’s 
appearance.  
Building on these two factors, Veale’s (2004; Veale et al., 1996) cognitive-behavioral 
model suggests that BDD is maintained by a negatively reinforced cycle that begins with 
external activation of negative self-images. Specifically, when the individual with BDD 
sees external representations of his or her appearance, such as viewing their reflection in 
a mirror, maladaptive or distorted beliefs about body image are activated. In turn the 
activation of these beliefs leads to increased vigilance for bodily flaws, thus engaging the 
process of selective self-focused attention to appearance. Because the individual believes 
that bodily perfection is necessary and possible, the detection of even the slightest flaw is 
perceived as a threat to the integrity of the individual’s identity and leads to negative self-
appraisal. Negative self-appraisal results in increasingly negative affect, thoughts about 
one’s perceived ugliness as compared to beauty ideals, and behaviors intended to reduce 
distress such as camouflaging and checking one’s appearance in the mirror. Although 
these behaviors may temporarily reduce anxiety, they also paradoxically increase the 
individual’s negative self-focused attention and selective self-focused attention to 
appearance, ultimately increasing anxiety and distress.  
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Similarities between BDD and Anxiety Disorders: The Role of Safety Behaviors 
Veale’s model of BDD illustrates the significant functional and conceptual 
similarities between this condition and the anxiety disorders. Specifically, accounts of 
these disorders all involve behaviors that are intended to reduce anxiety (i.e., “safety 
behaviors”), but that paradoxically maintain the problem and the related distorted beliefs.  
Safety behaviors in panic disorder and social phobia. Individuals with anxiety 
disorders, such as social phobia or panic disorder, engage in safety behaviors in an 
attempt to prevent the occurrence of a feared catastrophe (Salkovskis, 1991). However, 
these behaviors prevent the individual from learning that the likelihood and severity of 
the feared outcome are relatively low. Although safety behaviors may provide a brief 
reduction in anxiety, they ultimately maintain the problem by increasing self-focused 
attention, hypervigilance for threat, and negative feedback from others (Salkovskis, 
1991). For example, a man with social phobia may deliberately remain quiet in social 
situations so that others won’t notice his “ineptitude” with small talk. This strategy may 
make him less anxious at first but ultimately it reminds him of his belief that he is inept, 
making him increasingly anxious and vigilant for social slips. His consequent quietness 
and distraction make him appear awkward to others and result in negative social 
feedback. Thus, ironically his reliance on this safety behavior results in confirmation of 
his belief that he is socially incompetent, perpetuating his anxiety.  
Compulsions in OCD. In the context of OCD, compulsions function analogously 
to safety behaviors. Compulsions are idiosyncratic behaviors that individuals engage in in 
an attempt to mitigate the anxiety provoked by obsessional concerns (Abramowitz, 
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2006). Generally, compulsions provide temporary relief from anxiety and are thus 
negatively reinforced. In the long term, however, compulsions paradoxically increase 
anxiety by reminding the individual of their obsessional concerns, and by preventing 
opportunities for disconfirmation of faulty beliefs (Salkovskis, 1985; Salkovskis, 1989). 
For example, a woman with obsessional thoughts about catching HIV might engage in 
excessive hand washing because it briefly makes her less anxious. The hand washing 
compulsion, however, also reminds her of her belief that she is likely to catch HIV. 
Thereby in the long run the ritual increases the frequency of her intrusive thoughts, and 
provokes further anxiety. Additionally, engaging in the ritual leads her to falsely 
conclude that her continued health is due to her hand washing and not to the extremely 
low likelihood of being infected with HIV to begin with. Therefore, safety behaviors and 
compulsions are attempts at anxiety management that ultimately perpetuate distress by 
increasing the perception of danger and preventing disconfirmation of unrealistic beliefs. 
In the context of BDD, mirror gazing is perhaps the best example of a faulty anxiety 
management strategy which functions analogously to a compulsion or safety behavior. 
Excessive mirror gazing and BDD. While healthy individuals may spend a few 
minutes using mirrors to evaluate their appearance, put on make-up, shave, or style their 
hair, there are case reports of patients with BDD spending up to six hours in a single day 
scrutinizing their appearance in mirrors (Veale & Riley, 2001). Data suggest that this 
type of excessive mirror gazing occurs in at least 80% of individuals with BDD (Veale et 
al., 1996). Many patients with BDD conceal their mirror gazing behavior, perhaps due to 
fears of being perceived as narcissistic (Veale et al., 1996; Veale & Riley, 2001). 
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Therefore, existing data may even underestimate of the true prevalence of excessive 
mirror gazing in this population.  
Mirror gazing, like a safety behavior or compulsion, is thought to be performed in an 
effort to mitigate the anxiety provoked by internal (e.g., negative thoughts about one’s 
appearance) or external (e.g., mirrors, photographs) appearance-relevant stimuli. 
Specifically, negative thoughts may take the form of predictions that seeing one’s own 
reflection will trigger repulsion or disgust, or worries that one’s own appearance is so 
repulsive that it will result in social rejection. For example, a patient with BDD might 
have intrusive thoughts that his nose is horribly deformed and that others will be repulsed 
by it. He then feels the urge to examine his nose in a mirror in order to reassure himself 
that defect is “not so bad” or not so noticeable to others. As in safety behaviors or 
compulsions, however, his mirror gazing backfires making him feel exquisitely sensitive 
to his appearance, and thus even more anxious and distressed about how he looks.  
Why does mirror gazing fail to disconfirm distorted beliefs and reduce anxiety or 
appearance dissatisfaction in those with BDD? Veale’s (2004) model suggests that 
selective negative attention to the “flaw” and mental comparisons to beauty ideals 
contribute to increased anxiety following mirror gazing. First, selective self-focused 
attention to the flaw is thought to be problematic because it is accompanied by emotional 
reasoning. That is, the patient is likely to be anxious going into a mirror gazing session. 
He then uses emotional reasoning in an attempt to explain his negative affective state 
(e.g., “Why do I feel anxious?”, “It must be because my nose truly is horribly hideous”). 
Selective self-focused attention is also thought to be problematic because intense and 
prolonged inspection of the “ugly” area may cause perceptual alterations. As a 
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consequence of these perceptual changes, the patient loses their sense of proportions 
resulting in distorted or enlarged images of the “defective” area (Veale & Riley, 2001). 
Second, cognitive comparisons to beauty ideals are problematic because the individual 
uses inappropriate comparison targets or unrealistic ideals. Thus if our anxious patient 
compares his nose to that of a male model, this is likely to confirm his belief that his nose 
is in fact ugly in comparison.  
Patients report that the urge to engage in mirror gazing is extremely strong. In fact, 
many individuals with BDD endorse the belief that looking in the mirror is the only way 
to gain relief from the distress provoked by negative thoughts about their appearance 
(Veale & Riley, 2001). Despite this, there appears to be some recognition that mirror 
gazing is not an effective means or reducing anxiety and distress. For example, some 
individuals may alternate between scrutinizing their appearance in mirrors excessively 
and avoiding mirrors entirely. In one study, as many as 67% of individuals with BDD 
engaged in “selective” mirror avoidance.  That is, they either avoided certain mirrors 
because they did not like the way they appeared in them or they avoided all mirrors for 
limited periods of time (Veale & Riley, 2001). If patients realize that looking in the 
mirror results in increased distress, then why does mirror gazing behavior persist? Veale 
(2004) suggests that gazing behavior persists because patients are intermittently 
positively reinforced when they see themselves in a “good light” or in a “good mirror.” 
This may lead patients to believe that looking in different mirrors may have more a more 
positive outcome. There may also be some mood dependent reinforcement where in the 
individual views their reflection while they are in a good mood and, via emotional 
reasoning, attributes their positive mood to their appearance (e.g., “I feel pretty happy”, 
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“My nose must not look that bad after all”).  Thus, these brief intermittent positive 
encounters with the mirror may be sufficient to maintain gazing behavior. 
Given the pervasiveness of excessive mirror gazing, and the key role it is thought 
to play in the maintenance of distress, most CBT based interventions for BDD make 
some attempt to help patients to change the way they use mirrors (e.g., McKay, Todaro, 
Neziroglu, Campisi, Moritz, & Yaryura-Tobias, 1997; Rosen, Reiter, & Orosan, 1995). 
Historically this may have resulted in some therapists suggesting that patients avoid 
mirrors entirely (Veale & Riley, 2001). This is both impossible and counterproductive. 
This mirror avoidance is similar to the rituals that some individuals with BDD resort to 
on their own. It results in the maintenance of distorted body image and excessive distress 
when patients accidentally catch a glimpse of themselves in reflective surfaces. Thus, a 
more nuanced understanding of how mirror gazing works to provoke anxiety and 
dissatisfaction is needed to help develop interventions that teach patients realistic and 
healthy ways to use mirrors. Veale’s (2004) theory provides likely candidate mechanisms 
(i.e., selective negative self-focused attention, and cognitive comparisons to beauty 
ideals) which warrant empirical investigation. 
Experimental Research and Mirror Gazing 
 Early research involving mirror gazing mostly focused on using it as a means of 
evoking self –focused attention. For example, in a series of studies in the 1970’s, 
researchers found that the presence of a mirror during experimental manipulations led 
participants to become more self critical and to attribute more responsibility for the 
outcomes of hypothetical events to themselves rather than others (e.g., Duval & 
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Wicklund, 1972, 1973; Fisher, 1970). From this body of research Duval and Wicklund 
(1972) formulated objective self awareness theory. It postulates that whenever a person is 
in a given environment, anything that reminds that person of their role as an object in the 
world will cause him or her to focus attention on him or herself while excluding all other 
factors in the environment. Thus, when events occur, whether positive or negative, the 
person will attribute causality to themselves. Wicklund and Duval (1971) found that 
mirrors, audio recordings of one’s own voice, and the presence of TV cameras are all 
effective means of increasing awareness of the self as an object.  
Extending from this work Buss and Scheier (1976) described state and trait 
aspects of self awareness as “self-awareness” and “self-consciousness” respectively. Buss 
and Scherier (1976) found that being in a state of heightened self-awareness could be 
induced by mirror exposure. Further, being in a state of heightened self-awareness and 
possessing high trait self-consciousness both increased the likelihood of attributing 
responsibility for an event to oneself. More recent research has examined the respective 
roles of self-consciousness and self-awareness with regards to the attractiveness contrast 
effect (Thornton & Maurice, 1999). The attractiveness contrast effect occurs when one is 
exposed to others who are more physically attractive than they themselves are and, as a 
consequence, the individual’s self-ratings of attractiveness become more negative 
(Thorton & Moore, 1993). In a study of the relationship between self-awareness and the 
attractiveness contrast effect, Thornton and Maurice (1999) surveyed the trait self-
consciousness of 57 undergraduate women. In order to elicit the attractiveness contrast 
effect, they asked participants to evaluate the “fashion image” being portrayed in 
photographs of attractive female models. Half of the participants were exposed to a 
  
 
11 
 
mirror while making these ratings in order to heighten state self-awareness; the other half 
made ratings in the absence of a mirror. The experimenters found that both trait self-
consciousness and state self-awareness increased the magnitude of the attractiveness 
contrast effect. They were unable to assess the impact of the interaction of self-
consciousness and self-awareness due to insufficient sample size. This study has 
important implications for understanding mirror gazing in BDD. If, as posited by Veale 
(2004), patients are making comparisons between their own appearance and an imagined 
ideal of attractiveness, gazing in the mirror may serve to increase appearance 
dissatisfaction by increasing state self-awareness and thereby accentuating the 
attractiveness contrast effect.  
Given that mirror gazing appears to heighten self-focused attention and awareness 
of the self as an object, it has also been investigated in the context of social phobia. Self-
focused attention is thought to play a critical role in the maintenance of social phobia by 
increasing hypervigilance for threat and by hindering performance on tasks which require 
attention to external social cues (Clark & Wells, 1995). In a series of studies Hofmann 
and Heinrichs (2002, 2003) examined the impact of a mirror manipulation on self-
evaluative statements in health undergraduates and social phobia patients. Participants 
were randomized into either a mirror present or mirror absent condition and then asked to 
write down three positive and three negative statements about themselves. Self statements 
tended to focus on appearance, competence, socially relevant personality characteristics, 
and non-socially relevant personality characteristics. Patients with generalized social 
phobia and students both reported more positive (e.g., “I have nice hair”) and negative 
(e.g., “I have bad skin”) self statements regarding appearance than statements falling 
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within the other three categories. Students and patients with specific subtypes of social 
phobia also reported less negative non-socially relevant personality characteristics (e.g., 
“I am lazy”) when exposed to mirrors. These findings suggest that mirror exposure does 
in fact heighten public self-awareness but may also moderate negative evaluation of 
private aspects of the self. It is interesting that the number of positive and negative self-
statements about appearance were balanced. This may, however, reflect the demands of 
the task (i.e., participants were instructed to give a balanced number of positive and 
negative statements). Thus, it remains unclear what the balance of appearance self-
evaluations might be under more naturalistic conditions. 
Beyond the work related to the social aspects of mirror gazing, there is very little 
research available on mirror gazing as it pertains to BDD and body image disorders. To 
date, there has been only one large self-report study of mirror gazing behavior in patients. 
Veale and Riley (2001) gathered data on “short” and “long” mirror gazing sessions in a 
sample of 55 patients with BDD and 55 healthy controls matched for age and sex. 
Patients and controls responded to self-report questionnaires about thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors during “short” and “long” mirror gazing sessions in the past month. A long 
session was defined as the longest time during the day that the person spends in front of a 
mirror. Patients were significantly more likely than controls to report one or more long 
mirror gazing session per day. The duration of long sessions was also significantly 
greater for patients than controls, with patients reporting an average session length of 
72.5 minutes. Patients also engaged in significantly more short sessions per day than 
controls. The length of short sessions, however, did not differ significantly between 
patients and controls, with patients reporting an average session length of 4.8 minutes. 
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The study also revealed that most patients engaged in gazing because they hoped that 
they would look different and because they felt the need to be certain of exactly how they 
looked. Further, most reported that they believed that they would feel worse if they 
resisted gazing. Despite this conviction, patients experienced a no significant increase in 
distress when they resisted gazing. Further, on average they reported feeling significantly 
worse about their appearance after mirror gazing. Patients were more likely than controls 
to selectively focus on the area of their perceived defect, rather than to evaluate their 
body as a whole. Finally patients, but not controls, tended to focus on internal 
impressions or feelings in judging how they looked during long sessions. Patients, but not 
controls, also appeared to engage in cognitive comparisons while gazing in the mirror, 
reporting behaviors such as, “pulling my features or squashing my nose to see how I'd 
look if I had plastic surgery”; “pull ugly faces to prove how disgusting I am” or “I try to 
permanently fix my image mentally.”  
Overall, these data are consistent with Veale’s (2004) model in that they suggest 
that selective self-focused attention to the perceived defect and cognitive comparisons to 
beauty ideals play an integral role in mirror gazing behavior. These findings also suggest 
that mirror gazing is motivated by poor affective forecasting and a drive to seek safety 
from one’s own negative internal body image. Therefore, Veale and Riley suggest that 
mirror gazing is, “best conceptualized as a series of idiosyncratic and complex safety 
behaviours, that [are] designed to prevent a feared outcome and in which the patient is 
seeking safety (Salkovskis, 1991).” 
Moving beyond data gathered from retrospective reports, Windheim, Veale and 
Anson (2011) recently conducted an in-vivo observational study of mirror gazing in 25 
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patients with BDD and 25 healthy controls. Patients and controls were asked to engage in 
a brief mirror check followed by a ten minutes of mirror gazing. Patients and controls 
both reported significantly greater appearance dissatisfaction and self-focused attention 
post-gazing than at baseline. Patients, however, reported significantly greater increases in 
dissatisfaction and self-focused attention than controls. This study provides more 
evidence that increases in self-focused attention may mediate increases in appearance 
dissatisfaction. The fact that this study was observational in nature, however, precludes 
us from drawing causal conclusions about the effects of self-focused attention. The 
impact of cognitive comparisons to beauty ideals was also not examined here. Further, 
this study only examined the impact of mirror gazing on appearance dissatisfaction and 
not on anxiety. It is difficult to argue that mirror gazing fits the anxiety disorder model of 
safety behaviors when we have no data on the relationship between the behavior and 
anxiety per se. 
Moving beyond descriptive and observational research, Mulken and Jansen 
(2008) sought to experimentally test the theory that prolonged inspection of the “ugly” 
part in the mirror might cause BDD patients to lose their sense of proportions, thereby 
increasing negative evaluations of their own appearance (Veale and Riley, 2001). On the 
basis of this theory, Mulken and Jansen (2008) hypothesized that a similar effect could be 
produced in healthy individuals who were induced to engage in prolonged mirror gazing. 
Fifty female undergraduates alternately viewed their own face in the mirror for 3.5 
minutes and a photograph of a neutral female face for 3.5 minutes. The order of 
presentation of the mirror and photo viewing was counter-balanced across participants. 
Before and after gazing in the mirror, participants rated the attractiveness of their own 
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face and that of the face in the photograph. Overall, contrary to the experimenters’ 
hypothesis, mirror gazing did not result in more negative evaluations of one’s own 
appearance. In fact when participants were divided in to high and low appearance 
satisfaction groups, as measured by baseline self report, participants who were initially 
high in satisfaction actually showed significant increases in satisfaction post-gazing. 
There was, however, a statistically non-significant trend for low satisfaction women to 
show a decrease in satisfaction post gazing. 
These findings appear contradictory to those reported by Windheim, Veale and 
Anson (2011), in that they suggest that mirror gazing, at least for brief sessions, is not in 
itself sufficient to increase appearance dissatisfaction. It may be that short gazing 
sessions (i.e., four minutes as opposed to ten minutes) are not sufficient to provoke 
increases in self-focused attention in healthy individuals. Thus, if self-focused attention 
mediates increases in dissatisfaction, this might explain why such a brief session would 
fail to provoke appearance dissatisfaction. Alternately, the short duration of gazing might 
not have been sufficient to provoke perceptual distortions, thus preventing the expected 
increases in dissatisfaction. In short, design problems with this study prevent us from 
drawing any conclusions about the role of either self-focused attention or perceptual 
distortions in mirror gazing.  
In addition to the three studies discussed here which examined mirror gazing in 
the context of BDD specifically, one recent study looked at mirror gazing as it relates to 
other body image disorders (Shafran, Lee, Payne, and Fairburn, 2007). In addition to 
occurring within BDD, pathological mirror gazing is also known to occur in disorders 
such as anorexia and bulimia nervosa (APA, 2000; Fairburn & Harrison, 2003). 
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Following from this, Shafran, Lee, Payne, and Fairburn (2007) examined the impact of 
“body checking” on body dissatisfaction and feelings of fatness in 60 undergraduate 
women. Given that this study was focused on weight and shape concerns, participants 
were asked to examine themselves in their underwear in front of a full length mirror. Half 
of the participants were assigned to a “high body checking” condition in which they were 
asked to scrutinize their bodies in a critical way in the mirror. The remaining half of 
participants were assigned to a “low body checking” condition in which they were asked 
to refrain from body checking and to instead examine their bodies in a neutral way. Post 
manipulation, body dissatisfaction and feelings of fatness increased among those in the 
high body checking condition and decreased among those in the low body checking 
condition. The body checking manipulation in this study likely approximated a 
manipulation of self-focused attention. Thus, this study also suggests that self-focused 
attention plays a critical role in evoking body dissatisfaction during mirror gazing. 
Further, it suggests that negative appraisal, and not just attention, is a necessary element 
in provoking dissatisfaction. This study, however, was designed to approximate mirror 
gazing sessions in patients with eating disorders and not BDD. Therefore, participants 
were asked to evaluate their whole bodies rather than focusing attention on a specific 
body area, as would be expected in BDD. Additionally, the authors do not report the 
length of gazing sessions or how sessions were terminated (i.e., by a fixed time or by 
participant choice). Thus, it is unclear whether the length of the gazing session was 
confounded with condition. Finally, this study also does not provide information about 
the relationship between mirror gazing and anxiety per se. 
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Specific Aims and Hypotheses of the Present Study 
Taken as a whole, the experimental literature leaves many questions about the 
role of mirror gazing in BDD unanswered. What is it about mirror gazing that makes 
something that is a thoughtless daily ritual for most, into a distressing and disabling 
safety behavior for those with BDD? Can the mechanisms proposed by cognitive 
behavioral theories account for a relationship between mirror gazing and distress? 
Further, if BDD is actually an anxiety disorder, does mirror gazing provoke anxiety and 
not simply dissatisfaction with one’s appearance? Critically, to date there have been no 
studies examining the impact of mirror gazing on subjective anxiety levels. Providing 
answers to these questions is necessary for informing our conceptualizations of how BDD 
is maintained and for clarifying our understanding of the relationship between BDD and 
other disorders such as OCD and social anxiety. The observational data we have on 
mirror gazing suggests that it may function as a safety behavior, but experimental 
evidence is needed to substantiate these claims. If a clear connection can be made 
between this behavior and anxiety, this will provide additional evidence to support 
changing the diagnostic classification of BDD. Additionally, a better understanding of 
how mirror gazing functions to maintain distorted thinking and perceptions would allow 
us to substantially improve the way in which mirror gazing is addressed in treatment 
protocols. Therefore, the primary goals of this study will be twofold: first we aim to 
examine whether mirror gazing provokes subjective anxiety, and not just appearance 
dissatisfaction, and second we aim to test the theoretical mechanisms thought to explain 
the relationship between mirror gazing and appearance dissatisfaction.  
  
 
18 
 
In order to accomplish these aims, we compared simply thinking about one’s 
appearance and simply mirror gazing to gazing conditions designed to replicate the two 
key cognitive processes that Veale (2004) proposed occur when individuals with clinical 
BDD mirror gaze: (1) selective negative self-focused attention to an area of 
dissatisfaction and (2) cognitive comparisons to beauty ideals. Each of our conditions 
built upon one another so that we would be able to isolate the individual and additive 
effects of simply thinking about one’s appearance, mirror gazing, selective negative self-
focused attention (SFA), and cognitive comparisons to ideals. That is, condition 1 
included only a prompt directing participants to think about their appearance, condition 2 
asked participants to engage in simple mirror gazing, condition 3 required gazing and 
negative self-focused attention, and condition 4 included gazing, negative self-focused 
attention and cognitive comparisons to ideals. We aimed to replicate these processes in a 
sample of healthy individuals so that we might infer causation where previous 
observational studies could not (Veale & Riley, 2001; Windheim, Veale & Anson, 2011).  
First, based on Veale’s (2004) theoretical model and the findings of Windheim, 
Veale & Anson (2011), we hypothesized that participants in the later three conditions 
would experience increases in anxiety and appearance dissatisfaction over the course of 
the mirror gazing task, while those in condition 1 would not experience significant 
changes in anxiety or dissatisfaction. Moreover, we expected a significant time of 
assessment by condition interaction. Specifically, participants in the simple thinking 
about one’s appearance condition (condition 1) would experience no significant changes 
in anxiety or dissatisfaction; those in the simple mirror gazing group (condition 2) would 
start with the lowest levels and show the slowest increases in anxiety and appearance 
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dissatisfaction; participants in the gazing plus self-focused attention group (condition 3) 
would start with higher levels and show greater increases in anxiety and appearance 
distress over time compared to those in condition 1 and; participants in the gazing plus 
self-focused attention plus cognitive comparisons group (condition 4) would start with 
the highest levels and show the greatest increases over time in anxiety and appearance 
distress. The effect of condition was predicted to hold above and beyond the effects of 
general distress and baseline measures of anxiety and appearance dissatisfaction. Finally, 
we hypothesized that there would be a main effect of distorted beliefs about the 
importance of appearance, such that higher levels of this variable would predict higher 
levels of anxiety and appearance dissatisfaction across all three conditions. As such, we 
expected that inter-individual differences in the variance of anxiety and appearance 
distress at time one (i.e., intercepts) would be partially explained by distorted beliefs, 
whereas change over time in trajectories (i.e., individual slopes) would not be explained 
by distorted beliefs. These hypotheses are consistent with Veale’s (2004) assumption that 
distorted beliefs about the importance of appearance amplify the deleterious effects of 
mirror gazing. 
  
 
METHODS 
Participants 
Eighty-seven undergraduate women from the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill (UNC) Introduction to Psychology participant pool were invited and agreed to 
participate in the present study. All eighty-seven women had completed a general online 
prescreening survey and denied having a current DSM-IV-TR Axis I mood or anxiety 
disorder, a current or past eating disorder, psychotic disorder, or body dysmorphic 
disorder. Following recruitment, participants were further assessed for the presence of 
these disorders via a structured clinical interview. Eight women were excluded following 
the clinical interview because they were presently experiencing a mood disorder (n = 4), 
OCD (n=1) or had a history of an eating or body image disorder (n =3). The remaining 79 
women were randomized into one of four experimental conditions. Participants ranged in 
age from 17 to 28 years old (mean = 20.01, SD =1.49). The sample predominantly 
identified as Caucasian (63.20%), African American (14.9%), Asian (12.6%), or 
Latino/Hispanic (5.7%). 
Given that the aim of the present study was to experimentally induce and test the 
mechanisms thought to provoke anxiety and body image dissatisfaction during mirror 
gazing episodes, we elected to use a healthy sample in which these cognitive 
phenomenon were theoretically absent or minimal. Further, we chose to use a young 
adult (i.e., undergraduate) sample because self-objectification, habitual body monitoring,
  
21 
 
 and appearance anxiety tend to be more pronounced in younger adults and 
adolescents (Tiggemann and Lynch, 2001). Thus, a young adult sample was viewed as 
likely to possess a fair amount of variability in distorted beliefs and to be responsive to 
manipulations of self-focused attention and mental comparisons to perceived ideals. In 
order to maximize internal validity, only females were included in this study of mirror 
gazing. Although BDD affects men and women at approximately equal rates, women are 
significantly more likely than men to engage in mirror checking and camouflaging 
behaviors (Phillips & Diaz, 1997; Phillips, Menard, and Fay, 2006; Perugi et al., 1997). 
Thus, the use of a female sample was thought to more accurately reflect the population of 
individuals most at risk of engaging in this behavior. 
The experimental protocol for this study was approved by UNC’s Institutional 
Review Board (IRB). Further, all participant recruitment and study procedures were 
conducted in accordance with IRB guidelines. Participants will received between .5 and 
1.5 hours of credit towards the completion of a six-hour course requirement for research 
participation. Credit was assigned to participants on the basis of how much time they 
spend completing the study (i.e., 8 participants only completed the clinical interview and 
were assigned ½ hour of credit for their time). 
Procedures    
Online prescreening. Before being invited to participate in this study, participants 
completed a larger screening battery designed to assess for eligibility to participate in 
several anxiety-related studies being conducted concurrently in the UNC Anxiety and 
Stress Disorders Clinic. This prescreening was treated as a separate study registered with 
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the UNC IRB. Participants in the prescreening study were informed that they may or may 
not be invited to participate in additional studies depending on their eligibility for those 
studies. This online screening battery was administered via secure Qualtrics survey 
software and all data were dynamically encrypted and stored on a secure server. This 
online survey was used for collection of demographic information and contained 
empirically validated measures of anxiety, depression, BDD symptoms, and distorted 
beliefs about body image. We chose to assess for distorted beliefs prior to the 
experimental session in order to minimize the risk of sensitizing participants to body 
image concerns during the experiment. In addition to these symptom measures, the online 
survey assessed for the presence of exclusionary criteria via open ended questions (e.g., 
“have you ever been diagnosed with a psychological disorder?”). Participant responses to 
these questions were carefully reviewed by study staff prior to inviting individuals to 
participate in the experimental portion of this study. 
Experimental session. A visual outline of the general procedures of the study, 
including their sequence in the experiment, is provided in Figure 1. Following completion 
of the prescreening measures, eligible participants were contacted by study staff in order 
to schedule an in-person experimental session. The experimental procedures conducted 
by undergraduate research assistants who were trained in conducting each aspect of the 
protocol. All experimental sessions took place in the same private office space. Upon a 
participant’s arrival for the visit, the experimenter initiated informed consent procedures 
and gave the participant an opportunity to ask questions about the study. The consent 
form stated that, “the current study aims to examine the relationship between thoughts, 
emotions, and physical appearance.” Participants were informed that they, “might be 
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asked to think about their physical appearance. Thus, participation in this study may 
involve some temporary anxiety or discomfort.  Risks of long-term emotional or 
psychological consequences are low, as the activities that you may be asked to engage 
in–looking in the mirror, examining perceived facial flaws, comparing oneself to others—
are similar to activities that most healthy adults engage in on a daily basis.” Participants 
were also be informed that there is a possibility of some anxiety and distress related to 
answering screening questions about psychological symptoms.  
Following completion of consent procedures, the experimenter administered a 
structured clinical interview in order to screen for exclusionary criteria. All experimenters 
were trained and evaluated for inter-rater reliability on this measure. Participants who 
met criteria for an exclusionary psychiatric condition, as outlined above, were thanked for 
their time and dismissed from the experiment. Contact information for on campus 
psychological treatment resources was provided to all participants. No participants 
endorsed suicidal ideation or intent at any time during the interview or experimental 
portion of the study.  
Following the interview, eligible participants completed baseline measures of anxiety 
and appearance satisfaction. Subsequent to completion of baseline measures, participants 
were randomized into one of four experimental conditions using a pre-generated random 
number table as follows: 1) simple attention to appearance (n = 19),  2) simple mirror 
gazing (n = 18), 3) mirror gazing + negative selective self-focused attention (NSFA; n = 
20), and 4) mirror gazing + NSFA + comparison to beauty ideals (n = 22). These 
conditions follow from Veale’s (2004) model of BDD maintenance discussed previously. 
They are designed to incrementally test the two variables thought contribute most to the 
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anxiogenic nature of mirror gazing in BDD: 1) negative selective self-focused attention to 
perceived “flaws” and 2) cognitive comparisons to imagined beauty ideals. Conditions 1 
(simple attention to appearance) and 2 (simple mirror gazing) served as a control 
condition for the effects of thinking about one’s appearance in the absence of a mirror 
and for mirror gazing alone. If the anxiogenic effects of mirror gazing are simply due to 
thinking about one’s appearance or the perceptual distortions associated with prolonged 
mirror gazing, then these control conditions should perform comparably to the other 
conditions in terms of provoking anxiety and appearance dissatisfaction.  
Following randomization, participants were seated at a table with a covered, 
freestanding, 12” diameter mirror, placed 12 inches in front of them. Mirror height was 
adjusted so that the participant’s full face was visible. This mirror distance and size were 
chosen to prevent inclusion of other body parts in the visual field and to approximate 
naturalistic mirror gazing conditions. We elected to ask participants to gaze only at their 
face in order to minimize the likelihood of evoking concerns about overall body size or 
shape. Room illumination was also controlled across conditions. That is, all sessions took 
place in the same well lit interior room. A lamp with a 100 watt, soft white florescent 
bulb was placed behind the participant and used simulate the lighting of a bathroom or 
dressing room. 
Prior to beginning the mirror gazing trial, participants were provided with condition-
specific directions. Participants in condition 1 were told by the experimenter that they 
would be asked to consider the appearance of their head and face for approximately 10 
minutes. Participants in conditions 2 were given similar directions but also told that they 
would be asked to simultaneously look into a mirror. Participants in conditions 3 and 4 
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also received similar directions but were also asked to identify, from a provided list, the 
area of their face or head that they are “least satisfied with.”  The list of face and 
head areas was generated based on data from several survey studies of patients with BDD 
(Phillips & Diaz, 1997; Perugi, et al., 1997; Phillips, Menard & Fay, 2006). The list 
includes all face or head regions which were most commonly identified by women across 
these studies. Skin quality (e.g., blotchiness, discoloration, wrinkles, pimples, acne, or 
blemishes) was the most commonly identified area of dissatisfaction (n = 23), followed 
by ear shape or placement (n = 6). Other participants identified aspects of the cheeks, 
chin, head hair, eyebrows, neck, or jaw line as least satisfactory. Participants in these 
conditions were asked to write a detailed description of the selected area, explaining their 
dissatisfaction with it. After selecting a facial/head area and describing it, participants in 
both of these groups were asked to concentrate and focus on the identified area while 
gazing into the mirror. In addition selecting and describing an area of dissatisfaction, 
participants in condition 4 were also asked to compare their identified facial/head area to 
an imagined ideal of this facial/head area. Participants were instructed to write a 
description of this imagined ideal including as much detail as possible. This process was 
intended to heighten the salience of this mental image during the mirror gazing task.  
Following administration of the condition specific directions, participants repeated 
the anxiety and appearance satisfaction measures administered at baseline. These 
measures were administered at this juncture in order to capture the potential effects of the 
experimental directions alone (i.e., prior to actively engaging in mirror gazing).  
Following completion of these measures, participants in all three conditions were 
instructed to either think about their appearance (condition 1) or to gaze into the mirror 
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for a period of ten minutes (conditions 2-4). A period of ten minutes was selected based 
on the fact that previous research suggests that a gazing period of ten minutes is 
sufficiently long to provoke appearance dissatisfaction in healthy controls (Windheim, 
Veale, & Anson, 2011). Further, pilot testing suggested that a mirror gazing session of 10 
minutes was sufficient to discomfort in participants blind to the hypotheses of the study 
and informed confederates. The experimenter observed the participant during the mirror 
gazing session via closed circuit camera in order to ensure that the participant is 
following directions. Participants were informed that a camera was present and that the 
experimenter could see and hear them but that nothing was being recorded. A protocol 
was followed to insure participants adhered to the task directions and did not engage in 
other distracting tasks. During pilot testing participants were observed via the camera 
playing with or adjusting the mirror. Thus, due to concerns about changing focal 
perspectives of the mirror, a directive asking participants not to touch or adjust the mirror 
was added to the experimental directions. Although it is possible that the camera’s 
presence may have elicited some additional discomfort for participants, the camera was 
present in all four conditions. Thus, use of video surveillance was not confounded with 
condition. Further, individuals with BDD often engage in mirror gazing in public, using 
other shiny surfaces such as windows or CDs to scrutinize their “defect” (Veale & Riley, 
2001). Therefore, the presence or awareness of an observer does not in itself compromise 
the ecological validity of the mirror gazing task. 
At five minutes into the task and immediately following completion of the task (i.e., 
after ten minutes of gazing or thinking), participants repeated the appearance and anxiety 
measures administered previously. During the mid-task assessment, the experimenter 
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stopped timing of the task. The mirror remained uncovered in front of the participant 
during the completion of these measures. Following completion of the measures, the 
timer was restarted and the participant was instructed to continue gazing for an additional 
five minutes. Finally, post-task measures were completed with the mirror present and 
uncovered. The directions for the mid-task and post-task measures prompted the 
participant to reflect on how they felt “right now in this moment” with regards to their 
level of anxiety and dissatisfaction with their appearance. We elected to use in-vivo, 
rather than retrospective, reporting here in order to minimize recall bias and in order to 
allow for examination of trajectories in change over time for this data.  
Following completion of the mirror gazing task, participants in all four conditions 
completed the Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS-S; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988). This measure was administered in order to assess participant’s general 
affective responses to participating in the experimental task. Finally, all participants 
completed a manipulation check/exploratory items measure and underwent debriefing. 
Measures 
General distress. Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale- Short Form (DASS-21; 
Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The 21-item short-form DASS will be used to assess for 
symptoms of depression and anxiety. Participants use a 4-point Likert type scale (0 =  
“did not apply to me at all” ; 3 =  “applied to me very much” ) to rate how much a given 
statement applied to them over the past week. The DASS-21 is composed of three 
independent subscales measuring levels of depression, anxiety, and stress. The total score 
and each of the subscales are considered reliable and valid measures of negative affect 
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(Henry & Crawford, 2005). The DASS displayed excellent internal consistency in this 
sample (α = .97). The DASS was administered online as part of the prescreening battery.  
Body dysmorphic symptoms. The Body Image Disturbance Questionnaire 
(BIDQ; Cash, Phillips, Santos, & Hrabosky, 2004) is a seven-item self-report assessment 
derived from the Body Dysmorphic Disorder Questionnaire (Dufresne et al., 
2001;   Phillips, 2005), a widely used clinical screening measure for BDD. The BIDQ 
assesses concern and preoccupation with physical appearance; appearance-related 
distress; the effects of body image concerns on aspects of social, occupational/academic, 
and role functioning; and avoidant behavior. Based on a 5-point Likert type scale format, 
higher scores indicate greater overall body image disturbance. Research suggests that the 
BIDQ is a highly reliable and valid measure of body image concerns in nonclinical 
samples (Cash and Grasso, 2005, Cash et al., 2004, Rudiger et al., 2007). The BIDQ 
displayed excellent internal consistency in this sample (α = .90). The BIDQ was also 
administered online as part of the prescreening battery.  
Distorted beliefs. The Beliefs about Appearances Scale (BAAS; Spangler & Stice, 
2001) is a 20-item measure of dysfunctional attitudes about body appearance. The BAAS 
is a unidimensional scale that addresses beliefs about appearance related to several 
domains: interpersonal situations, achievement, one’s self-view, and feelings. Participants 
rate their agreement with survey items using a 5-point Likert type scale (0 = “not at all”; 
4 = “extremely”). The BAAS is highly reliable and internally consistent (α= .94 -.96; 
Spangler & Stice, 2001).  The BAAS displayed excellent internal consistency in this 
sample (α = .97). The measure is also highly correlated with other measures of 
appearance related beliefs and is sensitive to treatments aimed at modifying dysfunctional 
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appearance related beliefs. The BAAS was administered online as part of the 
prescreening battery.  
Affect. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, state version (PANAS-S; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) consists of two 10-item mood scales (i.e., positive 
affect [PA] and negative affect [NA]). Each mood scale contains ten affect related words 
(e.g., irritable, interested) and asks participants to rate “the extent to which [they] feel this 
way right now” on a five point Likert type scale (1 = “very slightly or not at all” to 5 = 
“extremely”). The PANAS possesses good internal consistency convergent and 
discriminate validity (Watson et al., 1988). The PANAS displayed good internal 
consistency in this sample (α’s = .84-.87). The PANAS was administered to participants 
primarily as a measure of affective reactivity to participating in the experimental task. 
The PANAS was administered both prior to and following completion of the 
experimental task.  
 Clinical interview. The Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI; 
Sheehan et al., 1997; BDD-SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1997).is a brief 
structured clinical interview designed to assess for DSM-IV Axis-I disorders.  The MINI 
was selected for its brevity and strong psychometric properties. The MINI has good 
sensitivity and specificity, strong inter-rater reliability (all kappas > .75; Sheehan et al., 
1998), and is highly correlated with other widely used clinical interviews such as the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; First, Spencer, Gibbon, & Williams, 
1997). The MINI does not, however, contain a module assessing for symptoms of BDD. 
Thus, for the purposes of the present study the MINI was amended with the BDD module 
from the SCID-I (First, Spencer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996). The SCID-BDD module 
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was incorporated into the MINI in between the bulimia nervosa and generalized anxiety 
disorder modules.  
 The Eating Attitudes Test- 26. The EAT-26 is one of the most widely used 
standardized measures of eating symptoms and concerns frequently observed in 
individuals with eating disorders (Garner and Garfinkel, 1979; Garner, Olmsted, Bohr, & 
Garfinkel, 1982). The 26 item version (Garner, 1989) is a likert style scale which is 
highly valid and possesses good internal consistency (Garner, Olmsted, Bohr, & 
Garfinkel, 1982). The EAT-26 displayed good internal consistency in this sample (α = 
.81).Generally, a score of greater than 20 is considered indicative of the possible presence 
of disordered eating behavior or attitudes. In the present study, individuals with scores 
greater than or equal to 20 were excluded from participation. This cutoff was used both 
for the protection of individual participants and to ensure that the sample was selected 
from a healthy population.  
Repeated measures of appearance distress. Three visual analogue scales 
(VASs) were adapted for this study from scales used by Shafran, Lee, Payne, & 
Fairburn’s (2007) appearance checking study. The purpose of the first two scales is to 
assess degree of appearance concern (0 = “not at all concerned” to 100 = “extremely 
concerned”) and appearance dissatisfaction (0 = “not at all dissatisfied” to 100 = 
“extremely dissatisfied”) respectively. The purpose of the third scale is to assess the 
intensity of idiosyncratic negative appraisals of one’s own appearance. Scale three 
requires participants to identify their “strongest thought” about their appearance and 
evaluate how much they are bothered by it (0 = “not at all”, to 100 = “extremely”). All 
three VASs were administered at four time points over the course of the experiment (i.e. 
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baseline, time 1- post-directions, time 2- mid-task, and time 3- post-task). 
Administrations of this measure are indicated by an asterisk in the schematic of the study 
flow available in Figure 1. Participants were asked to respond to the VASs as they feel 
“in this moment.” Research suggests that VASs have good reliability in validity in a 
variety of contexts (McCormack, Horne, & Sheather, 1988).  
Repeated measures of state anxiety. The State Trait Anxiety Inventory, six item 
short form (STAI-6; Marteau & Beckker, 1992) is an abbreviated form of the original 20-
item STAI state questionnaire. The STAI-6 asks participants to indicate how much they 
feel a particular emotion (e.g., “I feel upset”) in a given moment on a 4-point Likert type 
scale (1 = “not at all”, to 4 = “very much”). The original 20-item “state” form of the 
STAI is a widely used, highly reliable measure of transitory anxiety states (α= .92; 
Speilberg et al, 1983). The results of a recent study suggest that the Marteau and Becker 
(1992) version of the STAI-6 is superior alternate versions in terms of fit in confirmatory 
factor analytic analyses (Tluczek, Henriques, & Brown, 2009). This version of the STAI-
6 also has good internal consistency (α= .79 - .81) and is very highly correlated (r ~ .95) 
with the original 20-item version (Tluczek, Henriques, & Brown, 2009). The STAI-6 also 
displayed good internal consistency in this sample (α’s = .75-.80).The scale is sensitive to 
change over repeated administrations (Marteau & Beckker, 1992). The STAI-6 was 
administered at the same four time points as the appearance distress VASs. Analogously 
to the VASs, participants were asked to evaluate their anxiety “right now, at this 
moment.”  
Manipulation check & exploratory questions. In order to assess adherence to 
the experimental directions, participants in all four conditions were asked to indicate via a 
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VAS what percentage of time they spent on the following: (a) focusing on a specific 
facial feature, (b) focusing on the whole face, (c) focusing on other things. Participants’ 
responses on these items could only add up to 100%. For example, a participant could 
indicate that they spent 50% on a specific feature, 30% on their face overall, and 20% on 
other things. Participants in conditions 3 and 4 were expected to indicate that they spent 
more time gazing at a specific facial feature than those in conditions 1 and 2.  
In addition to this participants in all four conditions were also asked to indicate (a) 
how much time they spent comparing their appearance to the appearance of others, and 
(b) how much time they spent imagining how they might change the appearance of their 
face or head (e.g., by getting plastic surgery, going to a dermatologist etc) and (c) how 
much time they spent thinking of other things. This was again a forced choice set where 
responses were constrained to sum to 100%.  We also asked participants in all conditions 
to briefly describe their thoughts during the experiments in an open ended free response 
questions. Although only those in condition 4 were instructed to engage in comparisons 
to beauty ideals, we expected that comparisons might be naturally occurring in 
participants across the other conditions as well. Thus, we elected to explanatorily 
evaluate the frequency of these types of thought across all conditions. Further, as 
discussed previously, individuals simply asked to mirror gaze without further directions 
(as in condition 1) may sometimes report increased appearance satisfaction (Mulkens & 
Jansen, 2008). Researchers have hypothesized that an increase might occur because the 
individuals are either focusing on the face as a whole, rather than selectively attending to 
certain features, or are focusing on a feature that they find particularly pleasing in 
appearance. Despite these hypotheses no descriptive data exists to provide information 
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about what is occurring in these types of conditions. Thus, we thought it important to 
evaluate both quantitatively and descriptively the cognitive processes experienced by 
participants in all conditions and particularly those in conditions 1 and 2.  
  
  
 
RESULTS 
The primary aim of this study was to assess patterns of change in subjective 
anxiety and appearance distress over the course of a mirror gazing task and to predict 
individual differences in these patterns from a function of the predictor variables (i.e., 
experimental condition and preexisting distorted beliefs about the importance of beauty). 
Given the longitudinal nature of this data, a multilevel modeling data analytic approach 
was utilized. Multilevel modeling (MLM), also referred to as hierarchical linear modeling 
(HLM), is an extension of the general linear model and does not assume that observations 
are independent of one another. Longitudinal data from repeated measures designs are 
hierarchical in nature (i.e., repeated observations nested within person) and thus can be 
represented as MLM growth models. These growth models consist of two-levels wherein 
individual growth is represented at Level 1 and interindividual differences are 
represented at Level 2 (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).   
Traditionally, data from repeated measures designs has been analyzed using fixed 
effects methods such as repeated measures analyses of variance (RM-ANOVA). RM-
ANOVA relies on the assumption that individual observations are independent of one 
another. Because multilevel data are by nature correlated, this assumption is commonly 
violated, resulting in standard errors and p values which are too small and t values which 
are too large. MLM, on the other hand, does not assume independence of observations, 
and the covariance structure is modeled directly from the data as a separate step during 
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the analysis (Max & Onghena, 1999). Thus because MLM is built for nested data, it 
provides a more accurate option for analysis of longitudinal data. Utilizing an MLM 
approach therefore enabled us to examine changes in subjective anxiety and appearance 
distress longitudinally during the course of a mirror gazing episode.  
On average, the sample endorsed low levels of anxiety, appearance 
dissatisfaction, and negative affect. The sample also displayed moderate levels of positive 
affect. Further, levels of negative affect, as measured by the PANAS, remained stable 
across the duration of the experimental task t(76) = -1.21, p = .23 (See Table 1 for means, 
standard deviations, and correlations among study variables). Given that the distributions 
of scores on these variables were moderately positively skewed, the variables were log 
transformed and the distributions were reexamined.  Implementing a log transformation, 
however, did not improve the skewness of these variables and thus, the original non-
transformed variables were utilized in subsequent analyses.   
Originally, two separate but parallel analyses were planned wherein anxiety and 
appearance distress, respectively, would be regressed on condition and body image 
beliefs. General distress and baseline levels of the relevant dependent variable would be 
entered into the models as control variables. An initial graphical analysis of the data, 
however, suggested that the trajectory of anxiety over time remained relatively flat for 
participants in all four conditions (see Figure 2). Further, initial MLM models fitted to 
predict subjective anxiety indicated a non-significant main effect of time and a non-
significant time by condition interaction. Taken together this suggests that a longitudinal 
analysis of anxiety over time is not feasible in this data set. Therefore, no further models 
with anxiety as a dependent variable were fitted. All further analyses described here will 
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focus on the longitudinal trajectory of appearance distress over time in this sample (see 
Figure 3). 
Diagnostics indicated that there were two cases which fell more than two standard 
deviations from the mean on the measure of body image related cognitive distortions. 
Graphical and statistical analyses suggested, however, that the inclusion of these two 
cases in the data set did not exert undue influence on model fit. One additional outlier 
was identified in the process of model fit evaluation and was excluded due to the fact that 
the case adversely affected level 1 and level 2 residual distributions. Further examination 
of this outlier suggested that this individual may have engaged in random responding. In 
line with model assumptions, residuals for all covariates appeared homoscedastic. No 
other violations of model assumptions were detected. 
Correlational analyses indicated that anxiety was positively associated with higher 
levels of appearance dissatisfaction, appearance concern, and general negative affect.  
Further, dysfunctional beliefs about the nature and importance of appearance were 
positively associated with appearance distress, appearance concern, anxiety and general 
distress. Prior to formally testing these associations using multilevel modeling, all 
continuous predictor and control variables were grand mean centered.  Thus, all 
interpretations are for a woman who scores at the mean on pretest distress, appearance 
dissatisfaction and dysfunctional beliefs about appearance. Time was centered around the 
first post baseline assessment.  
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Main Analysis 
  Step 1. Prior to testing predictors of appearance dissatisfaction, an empty random-
effects ANOVA was fitted to the data in order to decompose the within and between 
person variability in dissatisfaction. An interclass correlation coefficient (ICC) of 0.84 
was generated from the model, suggesting that 84% of the variance in body image 
dissatisfaction in this sample is accounted for by between person differences. Thus, as 
expected given the close temporal proximity of the assessment time points, there was a 
very high degree of dependence in this data. Therefore, in further models a serial 
correlation structure (AR 1) was fitted in order to account for the fact that errors in this 
data were correlated across assessment time points.  The serial correlation structure was 
significant and retained across all subsequent models. The incorporation of this type of 
error structure is known to create problems with the estimation of random effects, 
particularly random intercepts (Liu, Cao, Chen, & Zagar, 2007). In the case of this data, 
the use of an AR 1 error structure prevented SAS from correctly estimating random 
intercepts. Given, however, that a high degree of serial error correlation was observed 
and that our hypotheses in this case rely on the accurate estimation of fixed effects, we 
elected to retain the AR 1 structure despite this. Random intercepts generated from 
models omitting the AR 1 structure were used to estimate variance accounted for in 
within individual trajectories between models. The appropriateness of fitting a non-linear 
trajectory was also evaluated at this juncture. The inclusion of a non-linear term did not 
result in significant improvements in model fit and was not retained. Table 2 presents the 
fixed and random effects for each of the models fitted.  
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Step 2. The first substantive model tested the hypothesis that there would be a 
main effect of time, whereby participants’ appearance dissatisfaction would increase over 
the course of the experiment. For this model, time of assessment was centered around the 
first post-baseline assessment (time 1), and then entered at level 1. Thus, these results can 
be interpreted as changes in anxiety or appearance distress relative to levels of these 
variables at time 1. Random intercept and slope terms were fitted for “time” in this 
model. This model produced a non-significant fixed effect for time, indicating that there 
is no main effect of time observed in this data.    
Step 3. Following from this we fitted a third model in order to assess whether the 
addition of several time invariant control variables contributed to the prediction of 
appearance dissatisfaction. We incorporated the variables at level 2 in addition to the 
level 1 effect of “time.” Although time was non-significant in the previous step, it was 
retained here in order to allow for the examination of a potential time by condition 
interaction in subsequent models. Therefore, baseline appearance dissatisfaction (self 
reported via VAS) and general distress (i.e., DASS) were regressed on appearance 
distress. Baseline appearance dissatisfaction and general distress both significantly 
predicted individual intercepts (see Table 2). This suggests that women with higher levels 
of baseline appearance dissatisfaction and general distress remained more dissatisfied 
throughout the task than those who reported lower baseline dissatisfaction and general 
distress. These two variables together explained an additional 29.20% of the variance in 
individual intercepts. Both variables were retained in subsequent models. 
Step 4. Subsequently a fourth model was fitted to test our hypothesis that 
experimental condition would predict appearance distress above and beyond the control 
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variable and appearance beliefs. In order to accomplish this we incorporated the effect of 
“condition” at level 2 in addition to the effects of “time” (level 1) and the variables 
retained in step 3. Only a fixed effect was estimated for “condition” because it was an 
experimental variable and was expected to have the same effect on trajectories across 
individuals. The fixed effect for condition was non-significant indicating the absence of a 
main effect of condition. Although the mean dissatisfaction at time 1 varied between 
conditions, the difference in intercepts across conditions at time 1 was not significant in 
this model (see Table 2).  
Step 5. The final model tested the hypothesis that there would be a 
time*condition cross level interaction and that there would be a main effect of 
appearance beliefs such that women endorsing higher levels of appearance beliefs (i.e., 
higher BAAS scores) would remain more dissatisfied throughout the task as compared to 
women endorsing lower levels of appearance beliefs. Random and fixed effects were 
estimated for the slope and intercept of the interaction term.  
The interaction of time*condition was significant (see Table 2) and thus retained 
in this final step. The inclusion of this interaction term accounted for an additional 47% 
of the unexplained within person variance in dissatisfaction over and above the previous 
step. The interaction was probed using model implied simple trajectories and the 
regression of anxiety on time by condition was plotted (see Figure 4). Only the 
trajectories of conditions one and four differed significantly from zero. After controlling 
for baseline dissatisfaction and appearance beliefs, participants in condition one reported 
a significant linear decrease in their appearance dissatisfaction over the course of the 
experimental task, whereas those in condition four reported a significant linear increase 
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in their dissatisfaction over the course of the task. Those in conditions two and three 
reported no significant change in dissatisfaction from time one to the end of the task.  
The inclusion of appearance beliefs at this step was also significant (see Table 2) 
and accounted for an additional 66% of the remaining unexplained between person 
variance observed in step 4. That is, higher endorsement of appearance beliefs predicted 
more appearance dissatisfaction across the duration of the task. The interaction of 
appearance beliefs* condition was also tested at this juncture but was non-significant and 
removed from the model in order to conserve power.  
Overall, these results indicate that women in this sample who reported more 
appearance dissatisfaction, higher levels of general distress, and higher levels of negative 
appearance beliefs responded to tasks requiring them to consider their appearance with 
higher levels of dissatisfaction. Further, women who were asked to consider their 
appearance in the absence of a mirror generally became more satisfied over time. 
Conversely, women who were asked to consider their appearance while mirror gazing 
reported sustained dissatisfaction over time. Finally, only women who were asked 
compare their appearance to imagined idiosyncratic beauty ideals, while mirror gazing, 
reported longitudinal increases in dissatisfaction over time.   
Manipulation Check and Exploratory Measures 
 Participants in all four conditions were asked to indicate what percentage of time 
they spent on the following: (a) Focusing on a specific facial feature, (b) Focusing on the 
whole face, (c) Focusing on other things (see Table 3). Overall participants indicated that 
they spent approximately 80.08% of the time focused on the appearance of their face as 
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opposed to other topics. Participants in conditions 1 and 2 spent relatively less time 
focused on a specific facial feature as compared to those in conditions 3 and 4. This 
suggests that the induction of specific negative self-focused attention in the latter two 
conditions was successful. Participants in all four conditions were also asked (a) How 
much time they spent comparing their appearance to the appearance of others, and (b) 
How much time they spent imagining how they might change the appearance of their face 
or head (e.g., by getting plastic surgery, going to a dermatologist etc). Participants in 
conditions 2-4 spent more time that those in condition 1 considering how they might 
change their appearance. Despite the absence of any prompt to do so, participants in 
condition 1 spent the most time considering their appearance in contrast to the 
appearance of others. Given that participants in condition 4 were prompted to imagine 
how their appearance might better, they were prompted to rate the vividness of this 
image. Overall participants in condition 4 indicated that the vividness of their focal image 
was moderate in intensity.  
  
 
DISCUSSION 
 The aim of the present study was to experimentally examine the cognitive and 
attentional processes thought to underlie pathological mirror gazing behavior. Previous 
observational studies have failed to provide a means of evaluating potential causal 
relationships between these variables and appearance dissatisfaction. Further, previous 
research has largely neglected to examine subjective anxiety as an outcome of mirror 
gazing, despite wide speculation that BDD is functionally related to anxiety disorders. 
Therefore, the present study is critical to understanding how mirror gazing functions to 
maintain distress in disorder such as BDD and to clarifying the nature of the relationship 
between the behaviors observed in BDD and anxiety disorders.  
 One aim of this study was to clarify how mirror gazing functions to maintain 
distorted thinking and perceptions related to one’s appearance. Specifically, we set forth 
to test Veale’s (2004) theory that targeted negative self-focused attention and cognitive 
comparisons to beauty ideals are primarily responsible for the deleterious effects of 
mirror gazing observed in those with BDD. Further, we set out to test the alternative 
hypotheses that prolonged general attention to one’s appearance (i.e., condition 1) or 
mirror gazing in and of itself (i.e., condition 2) would be sufficient to provoke increased 
appearance dissatisfaction. Interestingly, we found that general self-focused attention, as 
in condition 1, actually resulted in a statistically significant decrease in appearance 
dissatisfaction over the course of the ten-minute trial.  Further, we found that mirror 
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gazing without specific instructions, as in condition 2, was only sufficient to maintain 
one’s level of appearance dissatisfaction over the course of ten minutes.  
First, these findings have important implications for the competing hypothesis 
that the effects of mirror gazing are mediated by some aspect of simply viewing one’s 
appearance for a prolonged period of time. It may seem intuitive that some mechanism 
other than visually inspecting one’s appearance is responsible for the harmful effects of 
mirror gazing reported by those with disorders such as BDD. Certainly many of us use 
mirrors for daily activities without any adverse emotional consequences. To date, 
however, there existed no empirical data to support the argument that inspecting of one’s 
appearance in a mirror for a prolonged period of time could not elicit a negative affective 
state. All previous studies, which we are aware of, have conflated visual inspection with 
directions to engage in either verbal or written self-appraisal (e.g., Shafran, Lee, Payne, 
and Fairburn, 2007). Thus, this finding is important because it allows us to rule out the 
possibility, at least in healthy samples, that prolonged gazing is inherently problematic. 
Further, it suggests that more complex cognitive and attentional process are at play in 
individuals with body image disorders who report distress related to mirror gazing.  
The absence of a negative effect of prolonged simple gazing may also suggest that 
perceptual distortions are not the means by which mirror gazing exerts its harmful effects. 
The perceptual distortions argument suggests that the act of directing intense prolonged 
attention to any particular body feature will lead to visual perceptual distortions. 
Consequently, the area may actually be perceived as ugly or distorted. This premise is 
supported by the observation that many individuals with disorders such as BDD present 
with beliefs about their appearance that are delusional, or nearly, so in nature and 
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intensity (Phillips, Kim, & Hudson, 1995). Although not instructed to do so, individuals 
in condition 2 reported spending a great deal of time focusing on specific facial features. 
Thus, if a perceptual distortion effect were occurring we would have expected to see a 
significant increase in dissatisfaction in this group. It must be noted, however, that we do 
not know if individuals in this group focused on one specific feature, or a number of 
different specific features in succession. If the latter were occurring, then perceptual 
distortions might be less likely to occur. Further, as noted earlier, it is not uncommon for 
those with BDD to engage in gazing sessions in excess of an hour in duration (Veale & 
Riley, 2001). Thus, it remains possible that perceptual distortions only occur during 
longer gazing episodes and that even a 10-minute trial might not be sufficient in duration 
to elicit such an effect. 
These findings also do not support the contention that diffuse self-focused 
attention, as in condition 1, is sufficient to elicit increased dissatisfaction. Although the 
finding that simply thinking about one’s appearance increased satisfaction in a healthy 
sample was unexpected, it is consistent with Mulken and Jansen’s (2008) finding that 
body satisfaction increased over the course of a gazing trial in individuals reporting a 
preexisting high level of body satisfaction. In the present study we intentionally recruited 
a well sample, absent of significant body image pathology. Therefore, it may be that they 
responded analogously to the “high satisfaction” sample in Mulken and Jansen’s (2008) 
work. Mulken and Jansen (2008) speculated that the observed increase in satisfaction in 
those high in body satisfaction might be due to healthier mirror gazing behaviors such as 
evaluating the face as a whole rather than focusing on a specific dissatisfying feature. Our 
data, however, suggest that this is not the case. Participants in condition 1 reported 
  
 
45 
 
spending as much time focused on a specific facial feature as they did considering their 
face as a whole. Therefore, it appears that the protective factors at play here are more 
complicated than the attentional focus of the individual.  
Perhaps individuals with generally positive body image possess some protective 
positive bias which is activated by evaluation of their own appearance. This idea is 
consistent with Wicklund and Duval’s (1971) assertion that when the construct of the self 
as an object is activated, responsibility for positive or negative events in the environment 
will be attributed to one’s self.  In the case of those with pre-existing positive body 
image, “positive events” may be cognitive in nature. That is, a prompt to think about 
one’s appearance may trigger memories or thoughts about being positive evaluated by 
others (e.g., receiving complements) or cause one to engage in favorable social 
comparisons between one’s own appearance and the appearance of others. This latter 
supposition is supported by the fact that individuals in condition 1 indicated spending 
more time engaged in social comparisons than participants in any of the other conditions. 
This is also in line with Veale’s (2004) argument that emotional reasoning plays an 
important role in the negative-self evaluation occurring in those with BDD during mirror 
gazing. In this case it is possible that emotional reasoning is operating in the opposite 
direction in healthy individuals such that general positive emotions going into the task 
trigger positive, rather than negative, self attributions.   
It is surprising then that we did not find a similar decrease in dissatisfaction in 
those simply asked to view their own face in a mirror (i.e., condition 2). As noted 
previously those in condition 2, simple mirror gazing, reported no change in level of 
dissatisfaction across the duration of the 10 minute gazing trial. While this argues against 
  
 
46 
 
the presence of a perceptual distortion effect, it is also not consistent with the idea that a 
positive bias or positive emotional reasoning effect occurred in the simple mirror gazing 
sample. Thus, it seems that in this sample there was something fundamentally different 
about the cognitive or attentional processes activated when participants were asked to 
consider their appearance in the presence, as opposed to the absence, of a mirror. It may 
be that the presence of a mirror exerts a reality grounding effect, thereby counteracting 
unrealistic or inflated elements of the individual’s positive bias.  For example, an 
individual with healthy appearance satisfaction may believe that they generally have 
“good skin.” When they are asked to think on their appearance in the absence of a mirror, 
memories of being satisfied with their skin or complemented on their skin may be 
activated thereby further decreasing their appearance dissatisfaction. When they think on 
the appearance of their skin in the presence of a mirror, however, they may notice small 
blemishes or imperfections, which in turn counteract the influence of their positive 
appearance bias. Interestingly, participants in this condition spent less time engaged in 
social comparisons than those in condition 1. Although this finding is a bit puzzling, it 
could be that this is evidence that the presence of a mirror in and of itself prompts 
individuals to engage in a greater degree of self-focused, rather than other-focused, 
attention. It should also be noted that Mulkens and Jansen (2008) only found increased 
satisfaction following gazing when they used a median split to divide their already 
healthy sample into high/low satisfaction groups. Thus, their high body satisfaction group 
represented an extreme sample. It is possible then that in a sample with such inflated 
body satisfaction the positive appearance bias might have been relatively invulnerable to 
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the grounding effect of the mirror. This could explain why their high satisfaction sample 
would perform analogously to condition 1 here. 
If general self-focused attention and mirrors in and of themselves are not 
sufficient to provoke increased dissatisfaction, we must now evaluate Veale’s (2004) 
proposed mechanisms: targeted self-focused attention and cognitive comparisons to 
beauty ideals. Only those participants in the condition that included comparisons to 
beauty ideals, in addition to gazing and targeted negative SFA (i.e., condition 4) showed 
a significant increase in dissatisfaction over the course of the gazing trial. It is notable, 
however, that the overall trajectory of change in dissatisfaction in this group and the 
group only engaged in gazing and targeted negative SFA (condition 3) were very similar. 
Further, individuals in both conditions 3 and 4 reported spending a considerable amount 
of time imagining how they might change or improve their appearance (e.g., via plastic 
surgery or dermatological interventions). That is, even though participants in condition 3 
were not instructed to make comparisons to beauty ideals or imagine changes, these types 
of comparisons were naturally occurring. Therefore, it seems that targeted attention to an 
area of dissatisfaction is sufficient to evoke thoughts of beauty ideals and desired 
changes. We asked individuals in condition 4, but not condition 3, to report on the 
vividness of these imagined changes. Thus, we cannot know if the prompt in condition 4 
elicited more vivid images and therefore resulted in statistically significant increases in 
dissatisfaction for this reason. It is possible that the images were equally vivid across 
both conditions 3 and 4 and that lack of significant change in condition 3 was due to 
power constraints rather than true meaningful differences between these conditions. 
Regardless, these data clearly support Veale’s (2004) premise that the targeted attention 
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to a specific facial feature plays a significant role in triggering the increased body 
dissatisfaction observed in conjunction with excessive mirror gazing.  
Because both groups 3 and 4 were actively engaged in making comparisons to 
beauty ideals, we cannot clearly evaluate the individual contributions of targeted negative 
self-focused attention and comparisons to beauty ideals. Indeed it may be artificial to 
even attempt to do so. We intentionally elected not to use an external means of prompting 
comparisons to beauty ideals (e.g., photographs from fashion magazines) in order to 
approximate a more naturalistic gazing environment and maximize external validity. It 
may be that people are simply not capable of negatively evaluating their appearance 
without imagining how it might be better or more perfect. This would imply a more 
pernicious role for targeted negative self-focused attention. 
Finally, we sought to evaluate the relationship between mirror gazing and 
subjective anxiety. Given the wide speculation of a close relationship between BDD and 
the anxiety disorders, there has been a conspicuous absence of research aimed at 
evaluating subjective anxiety as an outcome of the so called “safety-behaviors”, such as 
mirror gazing, observed in BDD. If we are to accurately term these behaviors thusly we 
must establish that individuals with BDD are in fact seeking to ameliorate the effects of 
some unwanted affective state. Is this state anxiety per se or simply depression or 
dissatisfaction? In the present study we failed to find any significant increase in anxiety 
over time in healthy individuals engaged in mirror gazing tasks. Taken at face value this 
would seem to imply that mirror gazing and the related cognitive and attentional factors 
do not trigger anxiety per se. Clinical observation and data from qualitative observational 
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studies, however, would clearly contradict the notion that mirror gazing does not evoke 
anxiety in those with BDD (e.g., Phillips, McElroy, Keck, Pope, & Hudson, 1993).  
Due to our experimental objectives we intentionally selected a well sample for 
this study in order to be able to better control the cognitive and attentional factors at play. 
As a consequence of this sample selection choice, however, we generally recruited a 
sample which was low in appearance related cognitive distortions.  It is likely that these 
distortions are themselves responsible for the anxiogenic nature of mirror gazing 
behavior in those with BDD. That is, if for example someone believes that looking good 
is critical to being liked by others then they are much more likely to respond with anxiety 
when the integrity of their appearance is challenged. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising 
that in a sample with low levels of these types of cognitive distortions that we failed to 
find a relationship between mirror gazing and anxiety. It may be that in symptomatic 
populations these types of cognitive distortions mediate an anxious response to behaviors 
such as mirror gazing.  
It is also possible that there is some other fundamental difference between people 
with and without BDD. Healthy samples are frequently used as analogues for individuals 
with anxiety disorders because anxiety symptoms and related cognitive distortions 
generally exist on a continuum from non-distressed to distressed populations (e.g., Stopa 
and Clark, 2001). This may not, however, be the case for BDD. Larger studies are needed 
to evaluate the prevalence and nature of these variables across distressed and non-
distressed samples.   
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Taken together these findings suggest that mirror gazing is not in itself a 
pathological behavior. Further, targeted negative SFA may play a much greater role in 
eliciting appearance dissatisfaction during mirror gazing than previously thought. Veale’s 
(2004) theory suggests multiple points of intervention for those suffering from distress 
related to mirror gazing. Specifically, it suggests that helping such individuals to avoid 
making comparisons to unrealistic beauty ideals or engaging in behaviors such as “mental 
cosmetic surgery” could provide a means of disrupting the mirror gazing cycle and 
reducing associated distress. The findings of this study, however, suggest that it may be 
impossible to help such individuals avoid these cognitive pit falls without first disrupting 
their negative evaluation of and focal attention to their targeted body area. This implies 
that interventions directed towards correcting underlying beauty related cognitive 
distortions and changing attentional patterns during gazing may be much more helpful to 
people with disorders such as BDD. Although targeted SFA was not sufficient to provoke 
additional dissatisfaction in this sample, it was sufficient to maintain the individuals pre-
gazing level of dissatisfaction. Thus, if individuals with BDD begin mirror gazing with 
more dissatisfaction, gazing that is characterized by targeted negative SFA will likely 
maintain elevated levels of dissatisfaction and related distress.  
Although the use of healthy sample in this study was important to answering the 
questions posed here, it also precludes us from drawing firm conclusions about the nature 
and impact of these variables in clinical samples. The next step here is to begin testing 
interventions based on the findings of this and related studies in populations with BDD 
and body image disorders. If the conclusions drawn here are valid then interventions 
designed to interrupt targeted negative SFA and underlying distorted beliefs should 
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significantly reduce the distress individuals with BDD and body image disorders 
experience during and after mirror gazing episodes. Further, such studies must evaluate 
subjective anxiety as an outcome. Unfortunately, we still cannot speak with authority 
about the relationship between BDD and the anxiety disorders because we simply have 
no data on the relationship between this disorder and the experience of subjective anxiety. 
If mirror gazing truly follows the pattern of behavior and affective responding observed 
in “safety behaviors,” then this would provide critical information for the diagnostic 
categorization and treatment of BDD and related disorders. Ultimately, more effective 
collaboration of researchers working in the anxiety disorders and body image disorders 
spectrums is critical to improving our understanding of the underlying phenomenon and 
treatment of these disorders. Overall, only a modest percentage of the variance in 
appearance dissatisfaction in this sample was explained by the combination of underlying 
cognitive distortions, negative targeted SFA and the cognitive processes examined here. 
Future work must continue to evaluate additional factors which may contribute the inter-
individual differences observed in appearance dissatisfaction occurring in the context of 
mirror gazing. The more complete a picture we can assemble the more effective our 
interventions will be for BDD and body image disorders.
5
2
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations of Primary Study Variables at Baseline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  N = 78. Asterisks (*) denote significance, where * is  p <  .05 and ** is p < .01.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
General 
Distress 
Positive 
Affect 
Negative 
Affect 
Anxiety 
Appearance 
Dissatisfaction 
Appearance 
Concern 
Appearance 
Beliefs 
General Distress _       
Positive Affect .09 _      
Negative Affect .19 .19 _     
Anxiety .11 -.22 .57** _    
Appearance Dissat. -.14 -.09 .39** .03** _   
Appearance 
Concern 
.13 .04 .23* .20 .45** _  
Appearance Beliefs .28* -.09 .20 .31** .33** .47** _ 
Mean 14.40 24.60 12.49 9.95 26.64 50.23 30.29 
Standard Deviation 14.99 7.08 3.28 2.75 19.55 23.46 17.74 
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Table 2 
 
 Fixed Effects (Top) and Variance-Covariance Estimates (Bottom) for Models Predicting  
 Appearance Dissatisfaction 
 
Note. Astericks (*) denote significance, where * is  p <  .05 and ** is p < .01.   Baseline Dissat. = baseline dissatisfaction VAS 
score, General Distress = DASS score, Appearance Beliefs = BAAS score, Time = time point of assessment. 
 
Parameter Empty 
Model 
β (SE) 
Model 2 
β (SE) 
Model 3 
β (SE) 
Model 4 
β (SE) 
Model 5 
β (SE) 
 Fixed Effects 
Intercept 
30.61 
(2.36)** 
29.84 (2.36)** 30.31 (1.00)** 
26.54 
(2.80)** 
29.56 (2.58)** 
Time  .78 (.88) .81 (.90)** .81 (.90) 6.12 (1.83)** 
Baseline Dissat.   .95 (.06)** .96 (.06)** .87 (.06)** 
General Distress   .23 (.09)** .25 (.08)** .10 (.08) 
Condition    1.59 (1.00) .30 (.93) 
Appearance 
Beliefs 
    .24 (.07)** 
Time*Condition     2.66 (.73)** 
 Random Effects 
Intercept/Intercept  . . . . 
Time/Intercept  26.32 (20.05) 34.77 (9.99)** 
29.74 
(10.22)** 
27.24 
(8.46)** 
Time/Time  2.97 (12.73) 
24.04 
(11.11)** 
24.16 
(11.09)** 
19.90 
(9.81)** 
AR (1) .87 (.02)** .86 (.03)** .45 (.09)** .44 (.10)** .39 (.10)** 
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Table 3  
Manipulation Check and Exploratory Items. 
 
Note. Participants were asked to rate the relative amount of time they spent focused on (a) a specific facial feature, (b) their 
whole face. Participants were also asked to rate the relative amount of time they spent (a) comparing their appearance to that of 
others (b) imagining how they might change or improve their appearance (e.g. by getting plastic surgery or going to a 
dermatologist) or (c) thinking of other things. Participants in condition 4 were also asked to rate the vividness of mental social 
comparisons or mental changes they imagined making to their appearance. 
Conditio
n Feature Whole Face Other  
Social  
Comparisons Changes Other  
Vividnes
s 
1 
37.94%  
(19.23) 
38.16%  
(15.11) 
23.90%  
(14.55) 
25.79%  
(29.54) 
25.95%  
(26.57) 
43.53%  
(31.69) 
. 
2 
48.83%   
(25.47) 
39.89%  
(24.23) 
11.28%  
(10.05) 
8.61%  
(15.51) 
49.44%  
(28.02) 
38.33%  
(26.62) 
. 
3 
67.50%  
(16.81) 
25.60%  
(15.98) 
6.90% 
(8.81) 
10.25%  
(15.34) 
52.25%  
(36.00) 
35.00%  
(34.00) 
. 
4 
56.00%  
(25.12) 
34.41%  
(23.20) 
5.50%  
(7.39) 
11.36%  
(14.32) 
48.86%  
(32.40) 
31.13%  
(30.39) 
42.68 
(23.03) 
 55 
      
 
 
  
 
Figure 1. This figure displays the flow of participants from prescreening through 
completion of the experimental task and exit measures. 
Participant Flow Chart 
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Mean Subjective Anxiety by Condition and Time of Assessment 
Figure 2. This graph display mean subjective anxiety by condition and time of 
assessment. Condition 1 = simple appraisal, condition 2 = simple gazing, condition 3 = 
gazing + negative self-focused attention (SFA) , condition 4 = gazing + negative SFA + 
comparisons to an ideal. 
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Mean Image Dissatisfaction by Condition and Time of Assessment 
Figure 3. This graph displays mean image dissatisfaction by condition and time of 
assessment. Condition 1 = simple appraisal, condition 2 = simple gazing, condition 3 = 
gazing + negative self-focused attention (SFA) , condition 4 = gazing + negative SFA + 
comparisons to an ideal. 
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Regression of Dissatisfaction on Time by Condition, Model Implied Trajectories 
Figure 4. This graph displays model implied trajectories for each of the four experimental 
conditions. Only simple slopes for conditions 1 (simple appraisal) and 4 (gazing + 
negative SFA + comparisons to an ideal) differed significantly from zero.  
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